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Big Brother’s Shadow: Decline in Reported Use
of Electronic Surveillance by Canadian Federal
Law Enforcement
Nicholas Koutros and Julien Demers*
Despite popular perception of increased government surveillance, particularly
since 9/11, a longitudinal study of the Annual Reports on the Use of Electronic
Surveillance, published by Public Safety Canada between 1973 and 2011, demon-
strates the opposite trend. This article first outlines this decline to situate the use of
electronic surveillance by federal law enforcement. The second section of the arti-
cle advances legal, political, and practical influences which are likely contributing
to the diminished use of wiretapping by police. The purpose of this article is to
present quantitative evidence to better inform the ongoing debate around extending
“lawful access” regimes in Canada. By using official government statistics as a
foundation, this article provides a practical grounding to the theoretical academic
and legal research that often informs law, legislation and public policy governing
the use of surveillance technology.
INTRODUCTION
Although wiretapping had been used as early as the American Civil War, it
did not become a serious concern for legislators, the courts, or the public until the
Prohibition era in the United States.1 At that time, as voices replaced Morse code as
a public means of communication, wiretapping expanded to be used both for “low”
criminal investigations by law enforcement agencies (LEA) to gather evidence and
for “high” espionage.2 By 1928, the relative disinterest of courts in the practice of
electronic surveillance reversed following the landmark case of Olmstead v. United
* Nicholas Koutros, MA, Carleton University, with a co-op option in the Policy branch
of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. He currently works as a privacy
and security consultant. Julien Demers is a JD student at the University of Ottawa,
French Common Law program, and a former research assistant and event coordinator
for the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. The authors would like to thank
Chris Parsons and Chris Soghoian for their review of early drafts of this article. We
would like to express particular appreciation to Chris Prince for his guidance and
patience during our time at the OPC and beyond.
1 Alderic Jimenez, e.g., Privacy: An Overview of Federal law Governing Wiretapping
and Electronic Eavesdropping (New York: Nova Science, 2010) at 3-4; David Watt,
Law of Electronic Surveillance in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1979) at 10-11.
2 Susan Landau, Surveillance or security?: The risks posed by new wiretapping technol-
ogies (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2010) at 72-73 [Landau]; see also US National
Wiretap Commission, Report on Electronic Surveillance (Washington, DC: 1976) at
33–38, online: National Criminal Justice Reference Service
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/Abstract.aspx?id=39007>.
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States, which opened the door to expanded use of wiretapping.3 Fast forward 80
years and society has become ever more reliant on electronic modes of communica-
tion. Now, many face-to-face interactions are conducted through the myriad modes
of communication available at the click of a button. However, this convenience
comes with the corollary of increasing concern over the use of surveillance in the
hands of both law enforcement and private enterprise. Yet parliamentarians in Can-
ada have not updated the statutes related to electronic surveillance since the late
1970s.4
In the period between the Prohibition of the 1920s and the counter-culture of
the 1960s, little was written, and less was said publically, on the issue of electronic
surveillance even within civil society.5 While literary circles became familiar with
the spectre of “Big Brother” following George Orwell’s novel 1984, published in
1948, the public interpreted the massive manpower necessary to create the panop-
ticonal country of Oceania as a commentary on autocratic regimes; something that
could never come to pass in a democratic state. It was not until the height of the
Cold War that “total surveillance” became felt to be a possibility, or indeed a vir-
tual inevitability, by ordinary citizens.6
When providing testimony to the United States Senate in 1965, a private in-
vestigator demonstrated an audio recorder disguised as a martini olive which cap-
3 This case focused on a Seattle bootlegger calling back and forth to Canada in order to
smuggle British spirits into Washington State from Vancouver. The US Supreme Court
ruled that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (forbidding unreasonable search
and seizure) did not apply to the use of wiretapping by government investigators be-
cause “there was no searching . . . the evidence was secured by the sue of the sense of
hearing and that only.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (U.S. Sup. Ct., 1928),
online: <http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/277/438/case.html>[Olmstead].
4 Note: In this article the terms “wiretapping” and “electronic surveillance” are often
used interchangeably. It should be noted that wiretapping is a specific type of elec-
tronic surveillance which involves intercepting circuit-switched telephony for the pur-
pose of surveillance, whereas “electronic surveillance” covers the entire range of inter-
ception modes. “Prior to the Protection of Privacy Act there was no legislation to
regulate and control the use of electronic surveillance devices by law enforcement per-
sonnel. In common law eavesdropping was recognized as a nuisance offence.” See
Norman MacDonald, “Electronic Surveillance in Crime Detection: An Analysis of Ca-
nadian Wiretapping Law” (1987)10:3 Dal LJ 142; see also Stanley Cohen, Invasion of
Privacy: Police and Electronic Surveillance in Canada (Ottawa: Carswell, 1983) at 78
[Cohen]; and, Law Reform Commission of Canada, “Electronic Surveillance,” Work-
ing Paper No 47 (1986) at 1–5, online: <http://www.lareau-law.ca/LRCWP47.pdf>
[Law Reform Comm of Canada].
5 Cohen, supra note 4 at 33.
6 For example, “Electronic devices have come to stay. They have a clear place in our
modern life in business and ordinary day-to-day existence. They may be generally di-
vided into ‘wiretapping’ and ‘bugging.’” From Government of British Columbia, Re-
port of the Commission of Inquiry into Invasion of Privacy (BC: 1967), online:
<http://www.llbc.leg.bc.ca/public/pubdocs/bcdocs_rc/286439/286439_report_com_
invasion_privacy.pdf>.
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tured the attention of both Senators and television audiences alike.7 Previously, the
public understood that these techniques were confined to the shadowy world of
espionage and detective novels. By “bugging” a public space such as Congress, the
public began to realise that the technology could be used covertly by anyone and
virtually anywhere. In the decade that followed, surveillance powers in the hands of
both public and private entities became a perennial concern for many political
groups, religious minorities, civil society, privacy scholars, security experts, the
courts, and the public at large.8
While an established group of researchers in Canada have wrestled with the
spread of surveillance technologies and their impact on citizens’ legal rights and
sense of privacy, little work has been done to analyse actual police use of wiretap-
ping.9 The purpose of this article is to backstop theoretical work by introducing
quantitative evidence to demonstrate how wiretapping is actually being used within
Canada. To do this, we have examined open-source data published in Annual Re-
ports to Parliament to analyse the trend of electronic surveillance in Canada from
1973 to 2012 in order to provide a longitudinal analysis of the entire dataset
through the past 32 years.10 It is our intention that these statistics, and the trends
which we have extrapolated from them, will encourage a fact-based discussion over
the appropriateness and necessity of electronic surveillance techniques in Canada.
At first glance, the trends in the annual reports appear to demonstrate that the
use of electronic surveillance by law enforcement agencies (LEA) has been steadily
declining. At the same time that many LEAs have publically advocated for an ex-
panded surveillance infrastructure; known in parliamentary vernacular as “lawful
access.” The second section of this article will explore some of the underlying driv-
ers of why LEAs feel that expanded lawful access is necessary, and why some civil
liberties advocates disagree. After outlining some key events that have likely af-
fected the use of electronic surveillance, this article will provide seven theories that
we believe to be influencing the trend. The final section will reflect on what we
have found by proposing subsequent avenues for research.
7 Robert Ellis Smith, Ben Franklin’s Website: Privacy and Curiosity from Plymouth
Rock to the Internet, (Providence: Privacy Journal, 2000) at 167.
8 While there are dozens of examples, the most high-profile of these is the widespread
interception in the United States conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA)
and other intelligence gathering organizations following the attacks of 11 September
2001. See Andrew P MacArthur, “The NSA Phone Call Database: the problematic ac-
quisition and mining of call records in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom
and Australia” (2007) 17 Duke J Comp & Int’l L 441, online:
<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=djcil>.
See also the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s complaint, EFF v. Department of Justice,
Complaint, (30 Aug 2012), Case No 12-01441 (DDC), online:
<https://www.eff.org/document/complaint-19>.
9 There have been several noteworthy Canadian researchers working in this area from
the vantage point of technology, law and policy.
10 These reports were originally compiled by the Solicitor General of Canada until that
office was amalgamated into the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Prepared-
ness in 2003. The reports tabled by the Solicitor General are housed within the Library
and Archives Canada. Reports tabled by Public Safety may be found online.
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The purpose of this article is not to validate or invalidate the necessity for an
expanded lawful access regime. Rather, we argue examining the actual usage of
electronic surveillance in Canada is essential in light of legislative change, industry
research, and governmental investment into expanded surveillance apparatuses;
particularly following anti-terrorism initiatives post-9/11. We have found that evi-
dence provided in annual reports is incomplete and is no longer able to encompass
the advances in technology. This is alarming because the reports are currently the
only avenue for the public to ground any fact-based discussion on the merits and
dangers of police surveillance. At the very least, this article will illuminate some of
the deficiencies within the existing public reporting scheme and encourage trans-
parency from within the LEAs themselves.
Overall, we expect that no single influence is responsible for the decline of
electronic surveillance; such a discrete conclusion cannot be drawn without broad,
long-term analysis of actual police applications, warrants, and other records that are
not open-source. Therefore, this article cannot weigh the impact of any single influ-
ence against another on the overall downward trajectory of electronic surveillance
because there are simply too many variables that must be accounted for. Rather, we
seek to demonstrate that current reporting regimes are inadequate in the contempo-
rary environment because it does not offer any context, analysis, or justification for
electronic surveillance as currently practiced in Canada. Until this can be remedied,
the onus to justify the need for greater powers must ultimately fall upon LEAs.
After all, protections of Charter rights — the fundamental basis for the societal
protections found in laws restricting surveillance — demand a clear accounting
based on publically disclosed qualitative data examined against the context of his-
torical trends; an element that is sorely lacking in contemporary reporting
mechanisms.
I. CANADIAN STATISTICS ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE:
OVERALL TREND ANALYSIS
Conceptually, it is difficult, some would say impossible, to conceive of pri-
vacy as severable from the notion of individual liberty and autonomy. Life,
liberty, security of the person and enjoyment of property are only meaning-
fully guaranteed if privacy is an explicitly guaranteed condition on the
grant of such rights.11
In his dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, Supreme Court Justice
Louis Brandeis predicted, “the progress of science in furnishing the Government
with the means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping” and, therefore,
“there is no difference between the sealed letter and the private telephone mes-
sage.”12 The opinion expressed by Justice Brandeis succinctly underlines the over-
all tone of Canadian surveillance jurisprudence. Simply put, various Canadian stat-
utes and provisions have created an expectation of privacy when using electronic
communications which is similar to that of a letter in the mail. Therefore, the power
of the government to intercept private communications should always be tempered
on the side of caution regardless of the mode in which a communication is sent.
11 Cohen, supra note 4 at 52.
12 Olmstead, supra note 3.
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This notion is expressed in multiple statutes at a very basic level, particularly
in the Protection of Privacy Act (1974) which amended the Criminal Code to ban
individual ownership of surveillance technologies and erected a clear “lawful ac-
cess” regime for LEAs, (which we will discuss in more detail below). Basically, the
Protection of Privacy Act sets out a process wherein LEAs are required to first seek
both ministerial and judicial authorization, in the form of a warrant, in anticipation
of intercepting the communications of a suspect.13 In 1977, the act was amended to
require LEAs to provide notification to investigative subjects within 90 days of the
date upon which the authorization was issued and to comply with strict court re-
strictions on how, what, and where suspects may be monitored.14 Taken together,
these two acts constitute Part VI of the Criminal Code of Canada which outlines
“Invasion of Privacy.”
Most significantly for the purposes of this article, the Protection of Privacy
Act required the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (and previ-
ously the Solicitor General of Canada) to “prepare and present to Parliament an
Annual Report on the use of electronic surveillance.”15 Federal authorities have
filed these reports faithfully each year, beginning with statistics for 1974.16 The
reports set out the length of time surveillance is conducted, describe the crimes
being investigated, the location of individuals under surveillance, and precisely
how many cases are brought to court (while success in obtaining a conviction is
unreported, as we discuss below). The reporting structure, however, does not man-
date any examination of historical trends. Although each report displays the data
from the previous four years, no long-term review of the figures has been published
since the regime was first implemented. The following section seeks to correct this
by examining the trends that can be extrapolated when the entire dataset is viewed
together. The trends are not presented in any particular order.
13 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c. C-46, Part VI, online: Justice Canada <http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/page-87.html#h-61>.
14 Exceptions are made in cases where an investigation is ongoing, involves organized
crime or terrorism-related offences. Notification in these investigations is being
delayed up to three years.
15 Public reporting was perceived as a key control for limiting surveillance of electronic
communications. In the report the Minister must include information such as the num-
ber of applications made for authorizations (judicial warrant) and for renewal of autho-
rizations. See Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Annual Report
on the use of electronic surveillance, (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada), online:
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/abt/dpr/index-eng.aspx>.
16 Although the 1977 amendments to the Protection of Privacy Act have not been modi-
fied in the past 35 years, compiling statistics based on the reports has proven to be
extremely challenging. Although many of these statistics change significantly in each
successive year, for the sake of clarity and consistency we included only the number
reported the final time — generally in the report four years later (i.e., the number we
use to report 2006 is found in the report for 2010). While we do not believe that this
will significantly alter the overall trend, it is important for observers to recognize the
source of our numbers. Overall this contributes to a perception that the methodology
has not yet been standardized and that it remains difficult to collect quantifiable data to
make sound policy choices.
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(a) Trend One: Overall Court Authorizations
Prior to starting any electronic surveillance operation, LEAs are compelled to
seek a warrant from the court. Each of these is recorded and filed with the Minister
of Public Safety who, in turn, is required by the Criminal Code to provide Parlia-
ment with statistics annually in the interest of public transparency. By examining
the total number of court authorizations issued per year over time, Figure 1 (below)
clearly demonstrates that the number of court authorizations granted for electronic
surveillance has steadily declined since reporting began in 1974.17
At the peak in 1976, roughly 1300 warrants for electronic surveillance were
issued; however, by 2011 the reported number of authorizations dwindled to a mere
116, a decrease of nearly eleven-fold. Indeed, the last year in which more than 200
federal court authorizations were issued was 1996, with a record low of 108 in
2010. These figures include audio and video interception, emergency authoriza-
tions, and cases where LEAs have been granted a time renewal to continue surveil-
lance under an existing warrant. Therefore, counting the number of authorizations
granted by the court provides a useful baseline statistic because it is the basic ele-
ment common to all types of electronic surveillance outlined in Part VI of the
Criminal Code.
Below we will discuss theories based on various historical, social, and techno-
logical developments as to why this decline may have occurred. If reporting meth-
odology is assumed to have remained consistent since 1974, the negative trend ob-
served below in Figure 1 is noteworthy on its own. As with any longitudinal
statistics, changes in reporting methodology within organizations over the thirty-
seven-year period may have impacted data consistency. That said, at first glance, it
would seem that Canada stands apart from many other jurisdictions globally where
reporting shows use of electronic surveillance is clearly on the rise.18 We believe
that legislative developments, bureaucratic policies, jurisprudence, and an evolving
social environment have exerted downward pressure on the use of surveillance.
However, this trend-line in isolation is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the
use of electronic surveillance is declining, and we will discuss why further below.
17 Solicitor General of Canada, Annual Report on the use of electronic surveillance, [28
Volumes] (Ottawa: Library and Archives Canada).
18 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Current Practices in Electronic Surveil-
lance (New York: United Nations, 2009)
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(b) Trend Two: Individual Notifications
Notification was included in the Protection of Privacy Act by amendments in
1977 to reassure the public that innocent suspects would be informed if they hap-
pened to be subject to an unsuccessful investigation through written notice mailed
to these individuals. To date, close to 40,000 such notices have been issued at an
average rate of 1140 notifications per year (see Figure 2 below). The obvious ques-
tion raised by these figures is their inconsistency with Figure 1, which notes the
number of annual authorizations. Taking 2006 as an example, only 106 surveillance
warrants were issued; yet a total of 996 individuals were notified they were under
surveillance in that year. Clearly, there is an incongruity between Figure 1 and 2
that must be explained.
To resolve this disparity, several points within the 1977 amendments are cru-
cial to note. First, notification may be delayed up to three years if: (a) the investiga-
tion is still ongoing after the authorization has concluded; (b) the investigation is
related to either terrorism or organized crime; or (c) a judge views the extension to
be in the interests of justice. In other words, notifications connected to these crimes
often come long after the fact.19 Ultimately, a “ripple effect” should be observable
because all individuals under surveillance must be notified at most three years later.
When the total number of authorizations in Figure 1 is compared with the total
number of notifications in Figure 2, these figures differ significantly.
19 For example, note the absence of notifications in the year 2001despite widespread fears
concerning terrorism, as compared to the spike in notifications three years after in
2003.
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Figure 2: Annual Individual Notifications of Surveillance20
Despite this inconsistency, Figure 2 is valuable as it demonstrates that, while
the courts are issuing fewer warrants for electronic surveillance, investigators are
listing more individuals as targets under each authorization sought. To be clear, in
1995 a single typical court authorization allowed wiretapping thirty separate indi-
viduals. In other words, it is crucial to note the disconnect between any total statis-
tic for warrants issued as compared to overall persons identified and affected by
surveillance. Unfortunately, 1995 was the final year that the number of individuals
named in an authorization was included in the Annual Reports prepared for Parlia-
ment and the statistic vanished without explanation in 1996.21 Without this data, it
is impossible to know for certain how many individuals named in the authorization
were ultimately notified that they were mistakenly surveilled. Further, it means that
it is virtually impossible to determine whether the decrease in authorizations sought
by federal LEAs is simply a function of having more suspects named on each au-
thorization or whether LEAs are steering away from electronic surveillance as a
whole.
20 Note: The notification requirement did not begin until 1977 amendments to the
Protection of Privacy Act.
21 No particular explanation is provided in subsequent years why the reporting structure
and level of detail was altered, although numerous commentators have highlighted the
general opaqueness of the figures provided in the Annual Reports produced for elec-
tronic surveillance. See for example Cohen, supra note 4 at 21-218; Louise Savage,
“An analysis of the federal and provincial Annual Reports relating to the use of court
authorized electronic surveillance by law enforcement officials in Canada” cited in
Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 4 at 10; Department of Justice Can-
ada, Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections — Toward Unity: Criminal
Justice and Corrections (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, 1969) at 85, 87, on-
line: <http://www.lareau-legal.ca/CCCorrectionsPart1.pdf>.
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(c) Trend Three: Types of Crimes Targeted with Electronic
Surveillance
A critical and often overlooked point central to any discussion of surveillance
law or the privacy risks of new monitoring technologies is that it is neither legal nor
practical for authorities to investigate all types of crime using electronic surveil-
lance. Interception of communications is an extremely complex operation requiring
strict evidentiary processes, technical expertise, operational supports, and signifi-
cant resource investment by LEAs and their partners.
Until 2002, the overwhelming focus of federal court authorizations for wire-
tapping involved the smuggling, production, and distribution of narcotics, precur-
sors, and other illicit items — likely because statutes such as the Proceeds of Crime
(Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act [2000] and others allows for as-
sets seized by police to be used to subsidize the cost of the investigation. Figure 3
reinforces this theory. Crimes customarily associated with wiretapping, such as ter-
rorism and espionage, are typically used by legislators to justify expanded lawful
access regimes yet barely register when directly compared to federal LEA’s focus
on contraventions of the Narcotic Control Act.
However, when that statute was replaced in 1997 with the Controlled Drugs
and Substances Act, warrant applications related to trafficking, importing and pos-
session never recovered due to changes found in the regulatory framework of the
legislation, which compelled LEAs to modify the way they approached such inves-
tigations. Four years after this act was promulgated, the reported data demonstrates
that broader Criminal Code offences (like murder, extortion and money laundering)
overtook drug investigations in federal court authorizations for wiretapping for the
first time. As a result, it is increasingly difficult to generalize about the nature of
criminal activity being targeted through electronic surveillance because a broad
range of Criminal Code offences have recently emerged in the data. However, it
should be noted that electronic surveillance is likely still primarily used for investi-
gating drug-related crime since any number of Criminal Code offences specified in
the report are usually used to charge members of organized crime or criminal gangs
who are suspected of drug trafficking. Broadly speaking, Figure 3 underscores a
long-standing assertion by police that electronic surveillance is used primarily to
gather evidence in drug-trafficking and organized crime offences, but this dynamic
clearly evolved after the 1997 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
The most disconcerting element of this particular trend is what was not found
in this section of Public Safety Canada’s annual reports. Generally, these reports
contain very little discussion or analysis — typically only a single page for “general
assessment” at the beginning of each section. Since 1999, however, the report
signed by the Minister of Public Safety has recycled the exact same wording in
many sections of the report. No mention is made of effectiveness, legal problems,
resource demands, or administrative hurdles and there is no compelling discussion
of the importance of interception of private communications for the investigation,
detection, prevention and prosecution of offences as frequently reiterated by LEAs
arguing for lawful access legislation. Legislators granted invasive powers in Part
VI of the Criminal Code on the understanding they would be kept up-to-date and
informed. However, one suspects they were not anticipating that the reporting au-
thority would cut and paste the content year after year. In this regard, the reports
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point more to degradation in the overarching system of accountability, rather than
any clear decline in surveillance.
(d) Trend Four: Locations of Electronic Surveillance
The issue of how a wiretap or surveillance device is placed, who is targeted,
and where the actual interception occurs raises substantive legal issues. These set
the parameters of an investigation and, in practice, govern what controls and limits
the court imposes as investigators undertake their surveillance, how the evidence
gathered may be treated in court, and may even prompt a judge to refuse the war-
rant application outright; even though statistics demonstrating the number of denied
warrant applications are not publically available. After all, under Canadian law,
private communications can occur anywhere — on street-corners or in cars, in
homes or over phones. Accordingly, courts at all levels have the power to shape
surveillance practices dramatically.
The legal aspects of intercepting private communications will be discussed in
greater detail in the second half of this article, but using location as an analytical
lens can be demonstrative of this trend (see Figure 4). For example, the bugging of
detention cells, police interview rooms, or covert recording using an informant or
undercover investigator (i.e., “wearing a wire”) was a common practice in the
1970s and 1980s. After 1990, owing to the court ruling on R. v. Duarte (which we
discuss below), these activities required a court authorization.
An increasing canon of surveillance related jurisprudence, coupled with
changes in how Canadians communicate electronically, likely explains the growth
of the “other” category in Figure 4. Beside this, the two obvious trends to note are
the relative decline in residential phone lines or premises being put under surveil-
lance and the increase in the number of vehicles being targeted. In 1974, 82 percent
of all authorizations targeted individual residences. By 2010, this dropped to 42
percent. By contrast, a single authorization was sought to target a vehicle in 1974,
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whereas over the past decade, roughly 20 percent of authorizations have specifi-
cally listed vehicles as targets of surveillance.22
(e) Trend Five: Organizations Conducting Electronic Surveillance
Another crucial caveat in this discussion is that the statistics compiled for the
federal annual reports only represent a narrow slice of the overall electronic surveil-
lance conducted by Canadian authorities. Due to separate statutory mandates and
jurisdictions, as well as varied reporting and oversight parameters, it is impossible
to present a conclusive statistical account of electronic surveillance across all levels
of government. As an instructive example, however, it may be useful to explore
how changes in the mandate of just one organization affected the surveillance oper-
ations and reporting of another. In the federal context, this is best demonstrated by
the rupture of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Se-
curity Intelligence Service (CSIS) — the former being responsible for criminal in-
vestigations and the latter responsible for intelligence gathering. In practice their
mandates have historically overlapped to a great extent.
In 1984, CSIS was created by extracting the mandate of the RCMP’s Security
Service and placing it within the ambit of a civilian body. Along with the personnel
who staffed the Security Service divisions went many of the long-standing investi-
22 Recent research by Christopher Soghoian seems to indicate that 95 percent of all wire-
tap authorizations in the US are now being directed at mobile objects such as cellular
telephones and automobiles. Canada, with similar market penetration for mobile de-
vices, does not appear to be mirroring this trend although “basket clauses” in warrant
applications may be inserted by authorities to cover off monitoring of secondary lines
and cellular phones. In these cases it may not be readily apparent in the authorization
precisely how the warrant is executed by the LEA and may not, therefore, always be at
the forefront of the authorization. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 144–147; Law Reform
Commission of Canada, supra note 4 at 39–42.
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gation activities of the RCMP, a good number of which hinged upon wiretapping
and other forms of electronic surveillance. Figure 5 (below) shows how, after 1985,
these court-authorized interceptions shifted from the reporting requirements listed
under Part VI of the Criminal Code to those set out in the CSIS Act and subse-
quently detailed in the Annual Reports of the Security and Intelligence Review
Committee (SIRC). When the trend lines are compared, the total number of war-
rants sought by the RCMP fell considerably, only to be countered by an increase in
warrants sought by CSIS; as can be seen in Figure 5 below. From 1984 to 1988, the
number of authorizations sought by federal LEAs dropped to almost half previous
levels, from 573 to 287 warrants.23 The balancing trend at CSIS did not decrease as
dramatically as the RCMP. CSIS now operates under an average of 231 court au-
thorizations to intercept each year, in comparison to the RCMP and its federal part-
ners which obtain only 141 authorizations to intercept annually.
Drawing a correlation between the decline in RCMP warrants and subsequent
rise of CSIS investigations is problematic because a number of other variables have
no doubt affected the figures. These might include the easing of tensions in the
Cold War, difficulty in justifying some ongoing investigations, or a more narrow
reading of reporting requirements in national security cases. However, these are
little more than educated guesses. Penetrating the opacity of CSIS is extraordinarily
difficult simply due to the nature of its mandate. Any researcher attempting to ex-
plore these issues should be warned that, as with most national security organiza-
tions, it is very difficult to gather much statistical data or first-hand explication on
“sources and methods” without first obtaining a security clearance, which in turn
prohibits public dissemination of the information. We must concede, therefore, that
it is entirely possible that no line of correlation (or causation) can be drawn be-
tween the RCMP and CSIS when it comes to the use of electronic surveillance.
23 “In 1983, the last full year in which warrants were issued under the Official Secrets
Act, the Solicitor General approved 525 warrants. The average length of time a warrant
remained in force was 253 days. However, a direct comparison of warrants issued
under the two statutes is not possible because of differences between them. Under the
Official Secrets Act, in general, each warrant authorized the use of only one covert
technique, such as a wiretap, against one target . . . Under the new Act [the CSIS Act],
however, one warrant can authorize the use of many devices against many targets”:
Security Intelligence Review Committee, Annual Report (Ottawa: SIRC, 1986) at 18-
19, online: <http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_1985-1986-eng.pdf>.
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(f) Trend Six: Methods of Surveillance
As noted above, it is important to view the statistics presented here with cau-
tion and attention to the limitations of reporting as currently structured. The draw-
backs of the current data elements required to be reported under Part VI of the
Criminal Code will be discussed in further detail below. For the moment, we will
use a single example of how the data presented in Canada on electronic surveil-
lance might be widely misread.
At first glance — and as noted previously — a casual observer might examine
the total number of warrants issued in Figure 1 for electronic surveillance and im-
mediately note the overall downward trend as an indication that police are using
electronic surveillance less. Depending on the orientation of the user, this may be
interpreted as an indication that Part VI is so restrictive that investigators are no
longer even trying to use the technique. Alternatively, this may indicate that all is
well with the control regime we have for interception of communications in Can-
ada. With all indicators down, privacy protective legislation must be keeping LEAs
within reasonable limits.
However, the premise of both of these arguments is flawed because they are
both based on the assumption that the reporting requirements fully encompass the
tools available to LEAs. Unfortunately, the assumptions made by the original legis-
lators about what can and cannot be intercepted; what qualifies as private commu-
nications in the global context; the number of people who can be listed on an au-
thorization; and even the definition of intercept itself (as we discuss below) no
longer hold true in the contemporary environment.
Basing reporting requirements on invalid assumptions may be concealing a
much more concerning trend. As reports from the previous Solicitor General of
Canada plainly demonstrated, just a single warrant for interception in 1995 could
involve the targeting of thirty separate suspects. Furthermore, a single interception
device planted under the authority of that single warrant might gather hundreds of
hours of private conversations, including innocent civilians on the other end of the
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line, which are not named in the authorization and are never notified they have
been surveilled. The 1995 report was a watershed in many ways and remains a
useful reference. It was the last report detailing total hours of intercepted communi-
cations (156,627 hours). It is also the last year a detailed discussion was set out
regarding the usefulness of wiretapping in investigating and detecting crime. Fi-
nally, it was the last year that concrete details on drug seizures and their street
value was provided. After 1996 these points vanish from the report, never to resur-
face.24 Therefore, we must caveat all of our findings and analysis with the dis-
claimer that is very difficult to draw any kind of positive correlation in support of
any argument for or against lawful access infrastructure due to the incomplete evi-
dence provided in the annual reports.
All qualifications aside, some clear patterns have emerged over the 38 years
for which we have data on electronic surveillance in Canada. Firstly, there is the
overwhelming use of the phone tap, with more than 80 percent of all authorized
interceptions taking place using this technique (Figure 7). Microphone “bugs” —
whether installed in buildings, vehicles or worn on persons — are expensive and
risk discovery, and are only used in roughly one authorization out of ten. Use of
audio-video surveillance (requiring a separate form of warrant under section 487.01
of the Criminal Code) only became a separate category for reporting methods of
surveillance in 1994 and remains rarely used despite reductions in the size, cost,
and power of micro-cameras, networking, and storage.
Further, as we discuss below, these reports do not take into account the role of
third-party administrators in electronic surveillance such as telephone and internet
service providers. The technological underpinnings of communications infrastruc-
ture have fundamentally changed in the past two decades, forcing investigators to
adapt their means of interception. However, surveillance powers as set out in law
were largely predicated on the assumption LEAs themselves would be personally
monitoring communications through a circuit-switched communications infrastruc-
ture. Since the 1970s, the vast majority of telecommunications are conducted
through packet-switched networks and private telecommunications service provid-
ers (TSPs) are often wholly responsible for administering these orders and turning
over evidence that they collect to LEAs, typically in real-time. Although new tech-
nologies now provide alternatives to direct surveillance, reporting requirements
have yet to incorporate this change and therefore likely only capture the small per-
centage of overall volume of electronic surveillance in Canada which does not in-
volve the TSP in some capacity.
24 Solicitor General of Canada, supra note 17 — as required by section 195(1) of the
Criminal Code.
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(g) Trend Seven: Declining Crime Rates, Costs and Conviction Rates
Intuitively, an obvious explanation to explore for a decline in use of wiretap-
ping would be the aggregate decline in the crime rate across Canada. Indeed, at a
superficial level, there does appear to be some correlation (see Figure 6 below) in
that the general trajectory of national crime rates corresponds approximately to a
similar decrease in the total number of wiretap authorizations issued. After all,
given that: a) lawful electronic surveillance under the Criminal Code requires that
police demonstrate that crime of certain severity is being investigated; b) that an
impartial judge must be convinced that evidence of that crime will be captured with
the surveillance measure; and c) the overall crime is falling, then it should come as
no surprise that LEAs do not need to use this invasive tool as frequently as in the
past.
Continuing with that logic, falling rates of crime (particularly serious crime)
mean fewer overall warrants for wiretapping are likely to be approved by senior
officials within investigative agencies or applications filed with the courts. While
review of provincial wiretap data may point to counter-trends (which is outside of
the scope of this article), we suspect overall downward pressure to be evident at all
levels of policing. Examination of the use of wiretapping at the provincial and local
level is yet another area unexplored by public research at this time.
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Figure 7: Annual Authorizations vs. Historic Crime Rate25
A close look at available data on police-reported crime, however, provides a
counter-point to this theory. As many police organizations assert, the total volume
of reported crimes is actually about the same today as it was in the early 1980s;
same number of burglaries, same number of domestic disputes, and so forth. What
has changed is the total population and demographics of Canada. Without going
into a lengthy digression on this point, which is better suited to criminology re-
views, we would highlight one telling indicator. By our estimate, in 1980 there was
a single wiretap authorization issued for every 2,000 reported crimes. In compari-
son, a wiretap warrant is issued for roughly one out of 19,000 reported crimes in
2010. Clearly, this type of surveillance has fallen out of fashion in the LEA com-
munity. In the next part of the article, we will explore reasons why this might be
the case.
25 Crime rate trend line from: Statistics Canada, Police-reported crime statistics in
Canada (2010), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2011001/
article/11523/c-g/desc/desc01-eng.htm>.
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II. INFLUENCE OF THE JUDICIARY (LEGAL CHALLENGES
AND COURT RESPONSES)
(a) Theory One: The Protection of Privacy Act (1974)26
The crucial question to be addressed is ever when and in what circum-
stances will we allow police to resort to intrusive powers . . . the intrusions
of the police must be structured, confined and checked within a regime
which is compatible with the demands of the Rule of Law. Intrusions should
not be legitimated which fall outside of a sequence of crime and
investigation.27
The first group of factors which may be exerting pressure on the use of wire-
tapping are the legal constraints established by federal legislation designed to pro-
tect civil liberties.28 As discussed in the section above, the Protection of Privacy
Act (1974) can be viewed as the foundation for the lawful access regime in Part VI
and therefore acts as the catalyst for the tension between law enforcement and civil
rights advocates. It represented the first attempt by the legislature to regulate the
interception of private communications by LEAs. Further, it declared all forms of
electronic eavesdropping illegal, with the exception of national-security operations
and wiretaps authorized by a superior-court judge, and established a full reporting
system for police compliance (i.e., Annual Reports). At the same time, the need for
this tool became increasingly important for law enforcement as it shifted its focus
in the early 1970s from street-level policing to intricate investigations into organ-
ized crime.
When the Protection of Privacy Act was first debated in 1972, the Commis-
sioner of the RCMP Joseph Carriere condemned the bill stating that it would, “vir-
tually wipe out the criminal investigation system and organized crime would not
only flourish but be virtually free of any barriers.”29 Even after the bill was passed,
the RCMP continued to bristle under the yoke of the requirements under section VI
of the Criminal Code. Two years later, Bill C-176 went before Parliament to bal-
ance what the law enforcement community considered to be unnecessarily cumber-
some requirements.30 The amendments to the Protection of Privacy Act would in-
crease the range of targets permissible under the Criminal Code, but imposed strict
reporting requirements to “notify persons under surveillance 90 days after the in-
26 Protection of Privacy Act, SC 1973-74, c. 50.
27 Cohen, supra note 4 at 28.
28 Referring to reported data, the use of electronic surveillance rises during the 1970s,
although this does not necessarily mean that the Act of 1974 was ineffective in con-
straining traditional police wiretapping procedures. In fact, the law enforcement com-
munity in Canada acknowledged from the outset that this legislation would represent a
significant burden in their investigation procedures.
29 See Greg Marquis, Policing Canada’s Century: A History of the Canadian Association
of Chiefs of Police (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993) at 332 [Marquis].
30 Bill C-176, 1st Sess, 29th Parl, 1973.
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stallation of listening devices”; sparking further tension between LEAs and civil
liberty advocates.31
According to Dr. Greg Marquis, a historian of Canadian policing and criminal
justice, the Act “hamstrung the police [because] mandatory notification jeopardized
long-term intelligence operations” even more than the original act by exposing po-
lice informers and allowing suspects to destroy evidence by informing them of the
investigation.32 Although the intention was to ensure a degree of accountability and
transparency by creating an expectation among Canadians that they would be in-
formed if their actions were being monitored, LEAs bristled at what they consid-
ered to be an unreasonable burden. Even today, the RCMP and its partners continue
to reiterate the same arguments formed in the early 1970s that the accountability
mechanisms within lawful access provisions in Part VI would make it difficult for
police to respond to crime and follow up investigative leads.
At the same time, the RCMP became intensely focused on bringing down or-
ganized crime by focusing on the leaders.33 Marquis notes that “the 1974 restric-
tions had severely handicapped the prosecution of professional criminals. Although
authorized taps had resulted in the arrest of more than 1,200 persons in 1975, these
had included few untouchables of organized crime.”34 The RCMP, having operated
within the parameters set out in the Protection of Privacy Act for two years,
claimed that the Act itself had already hindered many investigations. To introduce a
firm 90-day notification requirement on top of this would not provide LEAs with
sufficient time to gather evidence to prosecute the leadership of complex criminal
outfits. However, critics at the time argued that the prosecutions had failed because
the leadership of organized crime had outmaneuvered the RCMP at every turn and
expanded electronic surveillance would only be effective in catching those who
could likely be arrested through other means.35
Subsequently, “the panic over organized crime allowed the Liberal govern-
ment to extend the scope of electronic surveillance” by restricting some of the pro-
visions in the 1974 Act.36 By 1976, the original 1974 Act was felt to be an impedi-
ment to gathering criminal intelligence to bring legitimate criminals to justice.37
31 Ibid. at 334.
32 Marquis admits that the immediate impact of the Protection of Privacy Act (1974) is
difficult to reconstruct. Other experts on the history of policing in Canada argue that
the new law did not severely hinder police business as they understood the bill to sim-
ply be a “bureaucratic nuisance.” Based on the rapid increase in the number of inter-
ceptions collected immediately after the bill was passed, it appears that this latter ap-
proach is more likely. This may be the result of a perception in the minds of LEAs at
the time that evidence gathered within the parameters set out in the Act implicitly
grants carte blanche for admission into court, regardless of the spirit of the law. How-
ever, as we discuss in later sections, this perception changed following the landmark
ruling in R. v. Duarte.
33 Marquis, supra note 29 at 334-335.
34 Ibid. at 334.
35 Ibid. at 334.
36 Ibid. at 355.
37 Ibid. at 353.
BIG BROTHER’S SHADOW   97
Bill C-51 (1977) amended Part VI of the Criminal Code by extending the 90-day
notification to three years in addition to relaxing a number of the other provisions
found elsewhere in the Protection of Privacy Act.
Despite having little to do with organized crime specifically, the 1977 amend-
ment “listed a variety of offences for which wire-taps could be authorized, includ-
ing treason, high-jacking, bribery, perjury, fraud upon government, rape, murder,
kidnapping, extortion, counterfeiting, and trafficking.”38 Consequently, the 1977
amendments had weakened the notice requirements while at the same time ex-
panded the range of potential wiretapping targets. Nonetheless, the statutes enacted
in the 1970s reflected the Canadian public’s concern over the use of the surveil-
lance technologies and Parliament responded by enacting a statutory framework
which strictly defined how, when, and why LEAs could use electronic surveillance.
(b) Theory Two: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982)
It is for the individual to decide what persons or groups he or she will asso-
ciate with, what books he or she will read and so on. One does not have to
look far in history to find examples of how the mere possibility of the inter-
vention of the eyes and ears of the state can undermine the security and
confidence that are essential to the meaningful exercise of the right to make
such choices.39
The introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms into Can-
ada’s constitutional framework shook “the very foundations of investigation, arrest
and prosecution procedures.”40 From 1960 to 1982, Canadian civil liberties had
been nominally protected through the Canadian Bill of Rights, but these provisions
had offered only partial safeguards. There was no mention of privacy or even of
unreasonable search and seizure. By protecting civil rights and freedoms within the
constitution itself “[t]he new order [. . .] would make the 1980s a challenging era
for Canada’s police community.”41
Section 8 of the Charter, which enshrines the right of individuals “to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure,” complicated investigations using electronic
38 Ibid. at p. 336. It is difficult to cite the growing public awareness of organized crime as
the singular driver of bills such as C-51 and the 1974 Protection of Privacy Act. Rather,
the data in Table 3 demonstrates that electronic surveillance is most commonly used
for enforcing the Narcotic Control Act in conjunction with Criminal Code offences
such as Trafficking (ss. 5(1), Possession of property obtained by crime (s. 354), Con-
spiracy (s. 465), and Commissioner of an offence for a criminal organization (s.
467.11). Most often, these are charges which are only levied against members of organ-
ized crime outfits. Although this does not prove causation, it is important to note that
electronic surveillance is most often used to combat organized crime. In effect, the
RCMP used this to argue that a decline in the use of electronic surveillance would
reduce the deterrent effect and therefore increase the volume of organized crime.
39 Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation & Research), [1990] 1
S.C.R. 425 at 141, La Forest J, online: <http://scc.lexum.org/en/1990/1990scr1-
425/1990scr1-425.html>.
40 Marquis, supra note 29 at 377.
41 Ibid.
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surveillance.42 Unlike other rights, which are absolute, Section 8 implies that law
enforcement must exercise judgement in determining what is “reasonable” prior to
executing a search. Lawyers within LEAs are forced to weigh the reasonableness of
the request before submitting it to the court. This significantly altered the legal
landscape and meant that senior officials and counsel who were reviewing requests
to conduct surveillance had to be more cautious and judicious in their approval of
invasive searches because failure to prove reasonableness may result in the entire
case being dismissed due to a Charter violation during the course of the
investigation.
It would be several years after the introduction of the Charter that the intrica-
cies of surveillance law would be subject to detailed judicial scrutiny by the Su-
preme Court of Canada (SCC). In R. v. Duarte, Mr. Duarte was apprehended by the
Toronto Police after discussing a narcotics deal with an undercover police officer.
He argued that the Toronto Police had obtained this evidence illegally by using a
police informant to bypass the warrant application process.43 As the Protection of
Privacy Act was originally written, section 184(2)(a) provided an exemption which
did not compel LEAs to obtain a warrant if “a person who has the consent to inter-
cept, express or implied, of the originator of the private communication or of the
person intended by the originator thereof to receive it.”44 However, the defendant
claimed that surreptitious recording of a private conversation without a warrant had
violated his Section 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure even though
the police had acted within the bounds of the Criminal Code. The case served as a
critical precedent in surveillance jurisprudence in Canada because it reinforced the
interpretation that the unreasonable test requiring a court authorized warrant re-
gardless of the strict wording of the statutes.45 In considering Duarte, Supreme
Court Justices were forced to weigh the constraints of Part VI of the Criminal Code
provisions against the new expectations found within the Charter.
The SCC declared that gathered evidence as the result of an unreasonable
search was not admissible into court even if it strictly abides by Part VI of the
Criminal Code. At a broader level, R. v. Duarte demonstrated that LEAs must act
according to the spirit of the Charter, rather than the strict letter of any single stat-
ute. Implicitly, this imposed self-regulation on the part of investigating officers be-
cause it compelled them to consider whether their search would be unreasonable
even if it was still within the parameters of Part VI of the Criminal Code. Now, the
42 Interestingly, while counter-intuitive and difficult to verify decades later, section 8 of
the Charter may have actually driven the rise in lawful wiretapping authorizations ob-
served in Figure 1. The Charter may have discouraged the police in their reliance on
wiretapping, but realizing this increased scrutiny may have prompted police to apply
for more wiretap warrants so as not to put existing cases in jeopardy of being thrown
out at trial.
43 R. v. Sanelli, (sub nom. R. v. Duarte) [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30.
44 Criminal Code, supra note 13, s. 184(2)(a)). The one party consent exception to the
rule against interception was even upheld in the case of R. v. Cremascoli, (sub nom. R.
v. Goldman) [1980] 1 S.C.R. 976, online: <http://scc.lexum.org/en/1979/1980scr1-
976/1980scr1-976.html>.
45 Ian J McKinnon, “Recent Decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada Relating to
Electronic Surveillance” (1992) 50:2 The Advocate at 211–213.
BIG BROTHER’S SHADOW   99
interpretation of section 184 indicates that court involvement must be in anticipa-
tion of the surveillance unless the officer can demonstrate that it is necessary during
an emergency. This requirement cannot be waived if one of the parties consent to
the search.46 Even today, R. v. Duarte serves as the critical precedent for weighing
the test of “reasonableness” in reference to Section 8 of the Charter.
(i) Influence of Parliament (Legislative Change and Demands for Reform)
Judicial routines and legal rules make up the cornerstone of due process
and the rule of law — they are the central building blocks of a free and
democratic society . . . the objective should be establishing an optimal bal-
ance between security and liberty . . . the executive branch may be the ap-
propriate branch for developing security measures, but that does not make
it the most adept branch at establishing a balance between security and
liberty.47
The second major influence which may be the widespread use of wiretapping
originates from Parliament. Generally, lawful access legislation is intentionally
vague and focused on limiting electronic surveillance of those suspected of being
involved in serious crimes.48 However, the political orientation of the governing
party has very little to do with the introduction of expanded lawful access regimes
to the House of Commons. Both Liberal and Conservative governments have put
forward these bills because of the high profile of the Public Safety portfolio, espe-
cially following 9/11. Conversely, both parties are quick to criticize the ruling gov-
ernment’s policies on lawful access when sitting in opposition.
46 It should be noted, however, that the common thread between R. v. Duarte and other
section 8 precedents was the presence of Justice La Forest as a Supreme Court judge
from 1985 to 1997. Although it falls outside of the scope of this article, and expertise
of the authors, to analyze the degree of privacy activism on the part of the court, it is
clear that the jurisprudence established in the 1980s and 1990s has done much to assert
the authority of Canadian law over LEAs, especially at the federal level. However, it is
nearly impossible to trace the ripple effects of high court decisions to correlate trends
in electronic surveillance. Rather, it may be sufficient to say that cases such as R. v.
Duarte and others have bolstered the strong positions taken by privacy advocates both
within government and in civil society due in large part to the strong opinions of Jus-
tice La Forest on the issue.
47 Daniel J Solove, Nothing to hide: the false trade-off between privacy and security
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011) at 50.
48 Careful scrutiny of new investigative powers through parliamentary committees and
increasing awareness through highly visible federal and provincial privacy commis-
sioners may also have prevented function creep so effectively that the benefits of using
surveillance outweighs the potential consequence for its misuse. Generally speaking,
the political spectrum has little impact upon proposals for lawful access legislation as
various governments have attempted to introduce expanded powers, to uniformly nega-
tive response. At the same time it is clear that pro-privacy advocacy groups and wider
civil society have been instrumental in mobilizing public opposition to these proposals,
making parties think twice before proposing surveillance bills. This trend may be most
recently observed in the demise of Bill C-30 (41-1).
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In tandem with broader discussions around the Constitution and Charter, the
early 1980s were also a period in Canada where concrete revelations finally came
to light through the MacDonald Commission of Inquiry into how surveillance pow-
ers and legal authorities had been abused by police at all levels.49 Following the
final report and recommendations of that federal inquiry, Members of Parliament
and the public demanded that federal authorities be placed under greater scrutiny
and that authorities’ use of invasive investigative powers be better regulated. This
created a cascading effect that resulted in internal policy memos, directives from
the Minister’s office, self-regulation by policing lobby groups, and even a number
of back-bencher bills. Although these latter measures have never yet passed
through the House, these bills are often used by opposition MPs to attack govern-
ment policies while they are being studied in Committee. The most famous exam-
ple of this followed the 1970 October Crisis in Montreal.
(c) Theory Three: the Creation of CSIS in 1984
Public allegations regarding the extra-legal activities of the RCMP first ap-
peared in the media in 1972. Initially, mainstream coverage was limited and the
response of government tepid because the allegations had been levied by a niche
Québécois separatist newspaper, which itself had been under surveillance following
the October Crisis. By 1978 the Provincial Government of Quebec itself became
completely mired in a legal and political battle with the federal government over a
laundry list of RCMP wrongdoing that included acts of arson, break-ins, and theft
targeting left-leaning and/or separatist media. By the time the Keable Inquiry fin-
ished two years later, the committee’s report detailed frame-up attempts, blackmail,
mail tampering and illegal opening of mail, and illegal wiretapping by officers.50
Taken together, the RCMP’s reputation in the late 1970s was severely tarnished
due to the overzealous response to the Front de libération du Québec.
When the RCMP’s “dirty tricks campaign” was exposed: 
Morale within the RCMP sank. By the time the McDonald Commission had
begun its work in 1978, then-Solicitor General of Canada, Francis Fox,
found himself in the unenviable position of having to make a series of dis-
49 The RCMP’s Security Service Branch confronted many problems in the 1970s due to
the diverging techniques between security intelligence work and police criminal inves-
tigations. In 1977, the Trudeau Government established the McDonald Commission to
investigate the RCMP after a number of illegal activities or “dirty tricks” by its Secur-
ity Service Branch came to light. See Security and Intelligence Review Committee,
Reflections: Twenty years of independent external review of security intelligence in
Canada (Ottawa: SIRC, 2005) at 7-11, online: <http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/
pdfs/rfcrfx_2005-eng.pdf> [SIRC].
50 “Some of the most sensational disclosures have concerned the activities of the RCMP’s
secret ‘dirty tricks’ squads. One such grouping, G-4, described to the Keable inquiry by
RCMP Sgt. Claude Brodeur, stole dynamite, carried out break-ins, and even burned
down a barn allegedly to prevent a meeting between members of the so-called Quebec
Liberation Front (FLQ) and the U.S. Black Panthers.” Richard Fidler, RCMP: The Real
Subversives (Toronto: Vanguard, 1978) at 9.
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closures about the RCMP Security Service’s activities, including an admis-
sion that it had been engaged in extra-legal conduct for over two decades.51
This was so damaging to the organization that, following the findings and recom-
mendations of the McDonald Commission (1977–1981), the Trudeau government
announced in August 1982 the intention to establish a new organization separate
from the RCMP tasked with security intelligence.52
Introduced in Parliament in May 1983, Bill C-157 established the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), which began operating officially on 16 July
1984.53 The new legislation also created the Security Intelligence Review Commit-
tee (SIRC) and the Inspector General for CSIS to review the activities of CSIS and
report to Parliament separately from other federal law enforcement entities.54 Just
as important, “it created a framework to keep those powers in check — and that
framework has stood the test of time.”55 For the first time, Canada had legislation
that clearly separated security from policing and imposed clear accountability
frameworks to ensure that transparency and operational security could coexist.
While these organizations have distinct mandates, their areas of operations
often overlap. As Figure 5 (above) demonstrates, comparing the number of authori-
zations obtained by CSIS to those obtained by the RCMP demonstrates that CSIS,
which is notoriously secretive, acts to obfuscate the full scope and scale of state
surveillance in Canada. Unfortunately, the distinction between criminal investiga-
tions and state intelligence is extremely blurred, particularly following 9/11, and
this makes it unlikely that CSIS reports are likely to become any less opaque in the
near future. Therefore, further research is required to investigate the role of CSIS’
use of electronic surveillance and how this affects the overall trends.
(i) Influences Within Policing Operations (Effects, Costs and Complexity)
The boundary between the individual and the state, between privacy and
law enforcement, has been tested by the collision of the two forces: the na-
ture of criminal activity (liquor, drugs, terrorism) and the advances of tech-
nology (the automobile, the telephone, the internet). Sometimes the courts
succeed at adapting the constitutional principles to the shifting circum-
stances of the modern world. But when judges fail, the line defining consti-
tutional freedoms blurs and meanders.56
51 SIRC, supra note 49 at 10.
52 Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, History of CSIS, (2012) online:
<http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/hstrrtfcts/hstr/brfcssndx-eng.asp>; a special committee of
the Senate was also established to examine the legislation given public concern and
considerable political debate.
53 In response to committee recommendations made in its report entitled A Delicate Bal-
ance, the federal government amended the previous legislation by tabling Bill C-9 in
January 1984, which became law in June 1984.
54 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, supra 52 at 10.
55 SIRC, supra note 49 at 11.
56 David K Shippler, The Rights of the People: How Our Search for Safety Invades Our
Liberties (New York: Random House, 2011) at 58.
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As with all government departments, the use of certain techniques can always
be reduced to the question of resource allocation. Electronic surveillance is an ex-
pensive and time-consuming process in all jurisdictions, but it is particularly bur-
densome in a bilingual and diverse country such as Canada. Aside from the man-
power required to clear the legal hurdles in obtaining warrants and the technical
infrastructure which must be built in beforehand, there are also requirements for
specialized transcription, indexing, and annotation procedures to meet with court
requirements for disclosure. If one finally factors in Canada’s linguistic diversity,
the limited resources of LEAs for translation and training, and the multiplicity of
non-official languages which require specialized “listeners,” these elements trans-
late into wiretapping being a very expensive and resource intensive form of investi-
gation.57 Beyond this, following the ruling of the Supreme Court in R. v.
Stinchcombe which imposed finite resource limitations on police to gather evi-
dence, LEAs are now limited in the number of transcripts they are able to submit to
the court and that they must mine their records after the investigation is completed
to ensure to include only those parts which will assist the Crown in making its
case.58
In an era of tight budgets and fiscal restraint, LEAs have been forced to allo-
cate resources judiciously for maximum strategic impact. To date, however, Annual
Reports for electronic surveillance in Canada have not included figures on the rela-
tive costs associated with the exercise of this investigatory tool. As a result, it is
virtually impossible for non-practitioners to discern whether the decline is simply a
reflection of operational choices not to pursue interception as an investigative ave-
nue or whether electronic surveillance simply is no longer a resource-efficient tool
for investigators due to the ancillary costs involved. Although data is surely availa-
ble to policy makers within Public Safety Canada, the lack of qualitative analysis
disclosed by LEAs themselves makes assessing effectiveness difficult.
Open-source information indicate that the sheer volume of data collected
through electronic surveillance, coupled with bureaucratic constraints such as tran-
scription and translation, make it virtually impossible for investigators to justify the
practice — especially in the present environment of fiscal restraint. However, this
is not to say that law enforcement has not found new ways to obtain evidence
which are more efficient. Rather, these “unknowns” simply demonstrate that LEAs
are no longer utilizing the tools within Part VI of the Criminal Code. Nonetheless,
even if investigators are somehow able to continue to justify funding for maintain-
ing these operations, their adversaries retain the advantage of being substantially
more adaptable to technological change.59
57 This cost may also explain why the focus tends to be on crimes where seizure of cash
and assets — such as organized crime, smuggling and the illicit narcotics trade. The
sale of these assets may be used to offset at least some of the organizational outputs
consumed using complex, expensive investigative techniques such as electronic
surveillance.
58 R. v. Stinchcombe, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 754.
59 Collecting evidence via wiretapping may not even be particularly useful in obtaining
convictions as successive years of strengthened Charter s. 8 precedent and other legal
safeguards have rigorously defined the circumstances when introduction of captured
private communications are admissible in court. From 1974–2011, only approximately
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(d) Theory Four: Cyberspace & Technologies Without Intercept
Securitization refers to speech acts that characterize some problem as an
existential threat in a calculated attempt to justify extraordinary measures,
such as the suspension of civil liberties or pre-emptive strikes. The internet
is being securitized.60
The previous theories all assumed that LEAs have the capacity to conduct
electronic surveillance and that other factors have made them give pause before
using it. However, there is evidence that LEAs, confined as they are to their legisla-
tive parameters, simply do not have the capacity to carry out this function in the
increasingly complex telecommunications environment. Implied in the term “elec-
tronic surveillance” is that it extends well beyond traditional wiretapping to include
networks at all levels, satellite telephony, and any other communications facilitated
through an electronic medium. Given the sheer number of modes which communi-
cation can now be transmitted, LEAs find themselves at a distinct disadvantage in
trying to identify the mode in which a suspect is communicating, let alone intercept
the message.
At a very basic level, it appears that the breadth of communications media
expanded at a rate that LEAs did not have the time, resources, or expertise to keep
up. Part VI of the Criminal Code was amended in the 1980s to include specific
references to computer systems in search and seizure provisions and was expanded
again in the 1990s. While technology has evolved considerably since, proponents
argue that Canada’s laws have not kept pace because “increasingly complex tech-
half (49 percent) of suspects arrested due to evidence obtained from electronic surveil-
lance had court proceedings initiated against them. Of that group, convictions were
obtained only 58 percent of the time. This puts the overall successful conviction rate
for this technique slightly above one in four. When exclusively examining the past 10
years, the conviction rate further lowers to less than 20 percent. Trends in the US ap-
pear to corroborate the finding of a declining conviction rate for cases involving elec-
tronic surveillance. In the years since reporting requirements were first introduced,
wiretaps have resulted in a conviction in fewer than 50 percent of cases. During the
Obama administration this rate drops to roughly 32 percent. Although many of these
convictions would not be otherwise possible without the evidence procured through
surveillance, LEAs in the US and Canada may alternatively be beginning to confront
the reality that electronic surveillance often provides investigators with reams of inad-
missible evidence. The low rate of conviction does not necessarily demonstrate a con-
sistent trend because it is difficult to reconcile the total surveillance authorizations with
the total number of successful convictions. The primary reason for this is that convic-
tions are often two to five years following the initial investigations. Presumably, some
kind of “echo” in the statistics would reflect this correlation. Further research must be
done in order to match each authorization with its corresponding conviction on a case-
by-case basis. See Office of the US Courts, 2011 Wiretap Report (2011) online:
<http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports/WiretapReport2011.aspx>.
60 Milton L Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance
(Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010) at 160.
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nologies are challenging conventional lawful access methods.”61 As explained in
the 2003 report by the Department of Justice Canada: “the arrival of telecommuni-
cations industry deregulation, the Internet, cell phones, wireless e-mail, high speed
fiber-optic networks and VoIP has changed the picture considerably. Law enforce-
ment agencies find that these more advanced services present technical and legal
challenges to conventional lawful access methods.”62 Where a telephone wiretap
may have required a technical specialist and some deft fieldwork in the past, gain-
ing access to a suspect’s mobile phone(s), VoIP, or email exchanges now requires
specialists in law enforcement, telecommunications, and technology sectors work-
ing together.
In particular, the Criminal Code has not been updated to reflect the fact that
surveillance no longer primarily focuses on immobile modes of communication,
such as land line telephones. Part VI of the Criminal Code obliges, “interception
orders authorized by the courts to specify the location at which the interception will
take place.”63 The change in technological compatibility with lawful interception
means that, according to Susan Landau, 
Law enforcement’s job has become more challenging. When a telephone
number determined a location — “this line belongs to that apartment” —
wiretapping was straightforward. Now electronic surveillance is very differ-
ent. If the target calls using his own cell phone, he is easy to track. But
when the target uses an internet cafe, an anonymizing service, or VoIP,
tracking in real time who is talking with whom is often not possible. This
has created quite a shock for law enforcement.64
In an era where everyday communication occurs instantaneously across several de-
vices and multiple platforms, piecing together the puzzle has become virtually
impossible.
While Landau argues that LEAs have previously been able to adapt and cope
with the challenges brought by new technical innovations, there is a fundamental
difference with digital technology because it is happening in “Internet Time.”65 In
61 Department of Justice Canada, Summary of Submissions to the Lawful Access Consul-
tation (Lawful Access FAQ), (2011) online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/la-al/
sum-res/faq.html>.
62 A number of technological innovations that affect lawful access have emerged at a
dramatic pace since the 1990s. The Government has asserted, in a 2002 report on law-
ful access, that the rapid expansion in the use of wireless communication devices like
cell phones would “pose significant challenges if the infrastructure supporting these
devices does not include lawful access capabilities.” This has been the contention of
Canadian law enforcement for the past decade or more as “[t]he rate at which new
wireless technologies and services are introduced in the marketplace makes it very dif-
ficult for law enforcement [. . .] to sustain their technical ability to lawfully intercept
communications.” See Department of Justice Canada, Summary of Submissions to the
Lawful Access Consultation (2003) online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/la-al/
sum-res/sum-res.pdf>.
63 Department of Justice Canada, Lawful Access — Consultation Document (Legislative
Proposals), (2011) online: <http://justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/la-al/d.html>.
64 Landau, supra note 2 at 7.
65 Ibid.
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other words, “[w]e have experienced a profound change in societal behaviour in a
matter of a few years — and sometimes even a matter of months — not the decades
over which such adoption and change occurred previously.”66 Whether investiga-
tors have reacted appropriately to this change, or whether they require new powers
to do so, is an ongoing debate both in Canada and around the world.
(e) Theory Five: Online Investigations and Electronic Surveillance
You must remember, though you will not understand, that all laws weaken
in a small and hidden community where there is no public opinion. When a
man is absolutely alone in a Station he runs a certain risk of falling into evil
ways. This risk is multiplied by every addition to the population up to
twelve — the Jury number. After that, fear and consequent restraint begin,
and human action becomes less grotesquely jerky.67
While some large telecommunications service providers (TSPs) in Canada
have volunteered to incorporate some form of intercept capabilities on their infra-
structure, there is still no universal requirement for all companies to deploy inter-
ception capability within their systems. Authorities contend that occasionally police
or security officials have a court warrant to intercept but that companies simply do
not have the technical capability to comply with the order. Without a uniform re-
quirement for interception capabilities, suspects may choose to elude surveillance
by subscribing to smaller TSPs that cannot afford to upgrade. Indeed, some of these
“independent” service providers even advertise their lack of intercept capability as
a feature of their service.
Both Liberal — and Conservative-led governments have previously attempted
to standardize intercept capabilities, but each successive proposal has failed to re-
ceive Royal Assent for one reason or another. While the previous two attempts
failed because an election was called, the most recent iteration of lawful access
legislation was introduced in the 41st Parliament amid polarized public opinion. In
February 2012, the Minister of Public Safety Vic Toews introduced Bill C-30,
which would require companies to preserve logs of the internet usage of their users
upon request and make these available to LEAs on demand by stating in Parliament
that critics can “stand with us or stand with the child pornographers.”68 While civil
society and privacy advocates immediately denounced the statement, major TSPs
such Bell, Telus and Rogers remained completely silent on the issue, which if
passed, would have substantially altered the way they interact with the Government
of Canada. The fact that major TSPs neither criticized nor praised the proposal
lends credence to the theory that, in the debate between privacy and surveillance,
TSPs have an interest in cooperating with law enforcement so long as it does not
66 Ibid.
67 Rudyard Kipling, Under the Deodars (Adelaide: 2010) online:
<http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/k/kipling/rudyard/under/>.
68 John Ibbitson, “Tories on e-snooping: Stand with us or with the child pornographers,”
The Globe and Mail (14 February 2012) online: The Globe and Mail
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/tories-on-e-snooping-stand-with-us-
or-with-the-child-pornographers/article545799/>.
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significantly affect their business operations.69 Ultimately, C-30 died on the order
paper one year to the day later, but even then, TSPs were cautious not to comment
on its demise.
On the one hand, LEA requests offer TSPs a new revenue stream as well as a
government subsidized infrastructure upgrade which may be substantial depending
on the volume of requests which they receive. Currently, TSPs that voluntarily pro-
cess LEA requests do not publically report on how many they receive per year or
what they charge for each request.70 In the United States, researcher and noted
activist Chris Soghoian has found that American TSPs have established a pre-set
cost for delivering information to LEAs, with real-time interception ranging from
$700-$2400 (USD) in each instance.71 This means that American TSPs derive a
revenue stream of tens of millions of dollars simply for turning over data that is
already stored within their systems. It is likely that these prices are similar in Can-
ada, but it is unclear whether Canadian TSPs handle a comparable volume to their
American counterparts.
However, on the other hand, TSPs must also be cognizant of myriad federal
and provincial data protection laws that may trigger public complaints to the Office
of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada or provincial data protection authorities. In
addition, TSPs are acutely aware that improper disclosure presents the potential for
civil liability, damages, and tarnished public image. In Canada, it is this final ele-
ment which may be the most important going forward because of the increased
attention by Canadians over how their personal information is used.
The result is that major TSPs have taken a middling ground to avoid upsetting
the delicate balance they currently maintain.72 If compelled by future legislation to
69 Albert Gidari, “Companies Caught in the Middle” (2007) 41:4 USF L Rev 535.
70 That said, companies most likely maintain such statistics for compliance, accounting,
and/or court proceedings. For example, Telus (the third largest TSP behind Rogers and
Bell) recently stated they processed ten thousand search warrants and production orders
in the preceding three years; that is only a single provider. In the same period, there
were 355 federal law enforcement warrants for interception issued and reported in the
Annual Report; that is to all companies. Logic would seem to dictate that if criminals
are progressively transferring illegal activities from the “streets to cyberspace” then
Canadian LEAs may find the traditional electronic surveillance tools much less useful
without significant infrastructure upgrades by the TSPs. See R. v. Telus
Communications Co., 2011 ONSC 1143; reversed 2013 CarswellOnt 3216 (S.C.C.).
71 Christopher Soghoian, The Spies We Trust: Third Party Service Providers and Law
Enforcement Surveillance (forthcoming) at 15, online: <http://files.dubfire.net/
csoghoian-dissertation-final-8-1-2012.pdf>.
72 As noted in the Canadian legal reference, “cyberspace presents challenges for the ap-
plication of Part VI of the Code. Cyberspace offers technology never contemplated by
legislation with its roots in the mid-1970s. The jurisdictional debate concerning where
a private communication was ‘intercepted,’ for example, did not occur when wiretap-
ping first commenced, for as a practical matter, execution of the ‘wiretapping’ was
usually conducted close to the target.” Michael Geist, “Public No Pushover on Snoop-
ing Law” Toronto Star (30 October 2006) online:
<http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/1504/159>. See also: Robert W Hubbard,
Peter M Brauti & Scott K Fenton, Wiretapping and Other Electronic Surveillance: Law
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build in intercept capability, it is unlikely that LEAs will find that unwillingness on
the part of the TSP is an impediment to their investigations, provided that federal
funds are allocated to build-in these new capabilities. However, in arguing for fu-
ture lawful access provisions, LEAs will be unlikely to find these TSPs willing to
state their enthusiasm for such bills publically.
(f) Theory Six: Alternatives to Interception & Unreported Data
Public support for the responsible exercise of this power can only be engen-
dered where the public receives reasonable information concerning the ex-
tent and the nature of its use. Without such information it is natural for
fears and suspicions of abuse to exist.73
Significantly, there is no clear evidence or analysis in the public domain that
confirms police authorities’ consternation that investigations have been seriously
hampered by a lack of technical capacity. However, as we discussed above, we
have little sense about the true volume which surveillance is being conducted in
new communications media such as the internet and other digital networks because
current reporting regimes do not extend into cyberspace. As a result, it is the “un-
known unknowns” which may be exerting influence on the trends.
Additional research will be required in order to understand how the present
lawful access legislation in Canada is being actually used in the operational context
because open-source data of day-to-day operations is kept confidential for a variety
of reasons. Further, reporting requirements have not been reviewed in three decades
and, in relation to new surveillance powers conferred by the Criminal Code, the
following types of surveillance and monitoring are still not subject to the require-
ment that governments present a public report on their use:
• Interception without judicial authorization, to prevent bodily harm
[“emergency provisions”] (section 184.1)74; (see R. v. Tse)75
• Interception with the consent of one of the parties to the communication
[see R. v. Duarte] (section 184.2);
• General production orders (section 487.012);
• Production orders for commercial account information (487.013);
• Location tracking devices [bugs/GPS location] (section 492.1)
• Number recorders [i.e.: metadata intercepts] (section 492.2).76
and Procedure (Canada Law Book, 2000). See also: Gilbert, Kerr & McGill, “The
Medium and the Message: Personal Privacy and the Forced Marriage Of Police and
Telecommunications Providers” (2007) 51:4 Crim LQ, online:
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1302544>.
73 Cohen, supra note 4 at 211.
74 It should be noted that this article was submitted concurrent with the first reading of
Bill C-55 which would extend reporting requirements emergency intercepts.
75 R. v. Tse, 2012 SCC 16, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 531.
76 Dominique Valiquet, Legislative Summary of Bill C-50: An Act to amend the Criminal
Code (Canada: Library of Parliament, 2012) online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/
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Given the relaxed conditions in comparison to traditional real-time electronic sur-
veillance, these new investigative techniques may be potentially used in lieu of
traditional electronic surveillance because they are likely more effective and effi-
cient at finding useful evidence.
We suspect, though we cannot confirm, that these alternate lines of investiga-
tion likely explain why there are far fewer wiretap authorizations (which must be
reported in details stipulated under section 195 of the Criminal Code) compared
with previous decades. These alternatives to traditional interceptions are more ap-
pealing to police because the application requirements are less stringent and exter-
nal reporting requirements are non-existent. For example, a “production order” may
be used by LEAs to access copies of emails, secure transmitted transaction details
(metadata), or information about organizations logged online. Production orders
have historically been used on financial institutions that rarely reject complying for
fear of being perceived as obstructing an investigation. As with the surveillance
powers mentioned above, these production orders require no public reporting be-
cause they are access “after the fact” and are considered to be different from “live”
surveillance reported in the annual reports and there is no requirement to notify
individuals they had been subject to surveillance. With advances in web-logging,
bulk storage and other cloud technologies, production orders issued to TSPs have
arguably become far more relevant to LEAs than wiretapping and less onerous due
to largely compliant TSPs.77
When police have authorization to access an e-mail that has already been sent
or received by a suspect, it could more easily be obtained with a production order
or a warrant for search and seizure, rather than an actual interception warrant; de-
spite the fact that they are essentially the same. Current law does not oblige service
providers to collect traffic data or content data to provide law enforcement officers
with real-time access through the internet (although provisions in C-30 sought to
rectify this).78 As the Honourable Madam Justice Mackenzie mentioned in the B.C.
About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?Language=e&ls=C50&Mode
=1&Parl=40&Ses=3&source=library_prb>.
77 Three decades of refining of jurisprudence in support of s. 8 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms has clearly shifted the perception that electronic communications is
analogous to eavesdropping in a public place towards a legal perception much more
protective of privacy, where intercepting communications is akin to mail tampering
laws made a century earlier. There are long term indications that the judicial branch has
become less inclined to allow for the inclusion of evidence gathered through invasive
surveillance techniques. Successive Supreme Court decisions, most notably during the
tenure of Chief Justice La Forest, ruled on many cases involving invasive evidence
gathering and created strong precedent which have narrowed interpretation on these
techniques. See Daniel Scanlan, Digital Evidence in Criminal Law (Toronto: Canada
Law Book, 2011); Tamil Israel, “Production orders: impending tools of mass investiga-
tion (2012) online: <http://www.slaw.ca/2012/02/09/production-orders-as-tools-of-
mass-investigations>; Ian Smith, A compelling problem: privilege and production or-
ders (Toronto: Criminal Lawyer’s Evidence Update, 2005) online: The Law Society of
Upper Canada <http://rc.lsuc.on.ca/pdf/kt/privilegeAndProductionOrders.pdf>.
78 On the contrary, Canada’s private-sector privacy law stipulates personal information
should only be regularly retained to meet bona fide commercial purposes, not the con-
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Supreme Court case of R. v. Giles [2007], “there is a difference between inter-
cepting messages and searching messages that have already arrived at their in-
tended destination.”79 When attempting to explain declining use of wiretapping or
bugging as an investigative tool, this turns out to be a critical legal distinction by
separating electronic surveillance that is publically reported versus monitoring that
goes undocumented. For e-mail, SMS messaging, or PIN-to-PIN communications
to fall under the legal safeguards of Part VI, the communications must be inter-
cepted in real-time and must be strictly defined as a “private communication.”
From this standpoint, under the definition found in the Crown Liability and Pro-
ceedings Act, for an online communication to be deemed a “private communica-
tion” it must be: 
oral communication, or any telecommunication, that is made by an origina-
tor who is in Canada or is intended by the originator to be received by a
person who is in Canada and that is made under circumstances in which it is
reasonable for the originator to expect that it will not be intercepted by any
person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it, and
includes any radio-based telephone communication that is treated electroni-
cally or otherwise for the purpose of preventing intelligible reception by any
person other than the person intended by the originator to receive it.80
The designation of “private communication” has two requirements: there must
be a sender or recipient in Canada, and there must be a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the mode of communication. In addition, the definition of “intercept” in
section 183 is quite precise; because it necessitates the message be obtained in real
time, unlike other words such as “obtain” or “acquire,” which are used elsewhere in
the Criminal Code. Therefore, if a communication is stored, logged, cached, or
backed up routinely in any manner then LEAs need only wait for the online ex-
change to end and, the very next second, the protections and reporting requirements
of Part VI fall by the wayside. As a result, short of lawful access with real-time
online interception, most modern surveillance is unlikely to be considered “elec-
tronic surveillance” as defined in the Criminal Code and, therefore, does not fall
under normal reporting requirements. The cases electronic surveillance reported in
the annual reports are most likely outlier investigations where evidence could not
be gathered through any of the means detailed above. As a result, the statistics
which are publically disclosed in the Annual Report to Parliament are most likely
only a small snapshot of the overall volume of LEA surveillance in Canada. This
venience of governmental investigators: “Personal information that is no longer re-
quired to fulfil the identified purposes should be destroyed, erased, or made anony-
mous. Organizations shall develop guidelines and implement procedures to govern the
destruction of personal information.” See Personal Information Protection and Elec-
tronic Documents Act, S.C., 2000, c. 5, Schedule 1, Principle 5 — Limiting Use, Dis-
closure, and Retention.
79 In this way, most police monitoring in cyberspace likely falls outside the controls of
Part VI in the Criminal Code as these apply only to “interception” of “private commu-
nication.” From a purely practical standpoint, it can be difficult to intercept packet-
based email in real-time given that ISPs are not obligated to have such capability. See
R. v. Giles, 2007 BCSC 1147 at para. 7.
80 Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c. C-50 s. 16.
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attempts to gather evidence and the actual tools used by police remain just as
opaque as before 1974.
Practically speaking, this is cause for alarm because this means that the ac-
countability and transparency for police surveillance has become more opaque than
even before the Protection of Privacy Act. If this is correct then the popular percep-
tion of expanded surveillance is likely correct, and Canadians no longer enjoy any
reasonable expectation of privacy.81 Ordinary citizens who seek to discover how
they are being surveilled and investigated are likely to find it difficult to even find
generalized information because many of these new techniques are not common
knowledge outside of a very specialized group (i.e. people who would be interested
in reading this article through to its conclusion). This Canadian approach stands in
contrast with many other jurisdictions, most notably the United States and United
Kingdom, which have at least basic reporting requirements for many modern elec-
tronic surveillance techniques.82
(g) Theory Seven: Widespread Encryption
Cryptography is not a silver bullet. It provides security only for the commu-
nications content. In particular, the transactional information — who is
communication with whom when — is not encrypted. It is often the case that
transactional information is more valuable than content . . . it can indicate
that a company merger is about to occur, that nation-states are engaged in
negotiation, that someone is having an affair.83
The use of encryption is the final argument which LEAs often raise to support
arguments for increased lawful access provisions. Internet communications began
to adopt strong encryption measures during the late 1990s because of widespread
perception of cyber-security threats posed by “hackers,” organized crime, and ad-
versarial nation states. Law enforcement agencies globally signalled concerns that
widespread use of strong encryption techniques would block access to critical evi-
dence data and criminals would disappear into the many layers of the internet, what
is known now as “going dark.”84 In the past few years, this trend has accelerated
81 As a result, the legal reality is that online communications and internet transactions are
given considerably lesser privacy protections than traditional telephone conversations
and as noted, citizens have no real idea how often these online methods of monitoring
are used by Canadian LEAs owing to lack of required public reporting on the part of
the RCMP as well reticence on the part of ISPs to voluntarily disclose the information
for fear of a negative public reaction. See Hubbard, Brauti & Fenton, supra note 72,
vol 2, at 15–30.
82 See Interception of Communications Commissioner, 2011 Annual Report of the Inter-
ception of Communications Commissioner (London, UK: Interception of Communica-
tions Commissioner, 2012) online: <http://www.intelligencecommissioners.com/
docs/0496.pdf>. United States Courts, Wiretap Report 2011 (Washington DC, USA:
Administrative Office of the US Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary, 2012) on-
line: <http://www.uscourts. gov/Statistics/WiretapReports.aspx> [US Courts].
83 Landau, supra note 2 at 59-60.
84 Peter Swire, From Real-Time Intercepts to Stored Records: Why Encryption Drives the
Government to Seek Access to the Cloud (2012) International Data Privacy Law, at 4
[Forthcoming].
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and “encryption is in the midst of becoming the default way that many communica-
tions occur on the Internet.”85
There are certainly methods for Canadian LEAs to gain access to strong en-
crypted communications, but they are complex, onerous, and put LEAs at a distinct
disadvantage. In select intelligence-related cases handled by CSIS, the Communi-
cations Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) has the technological ability to in-
tercept and break encrypted communication. However, it is well outside of CSEC’s
mandate to assist the RCMP in domestic criminal investigations on citizens and
may threaten to overwhelm its operational capacity if used regularly.86 It should be
noted that, as with research into CSIS, it is very difficult to gather information on
how this organization works and what capabilities it can muster. All that is known
is that if the RCMP encounters an encrypted communication, it must decide
whether to utilize its in-house resources to gain access; an unpleasant task consider-
ing that the vast majority of encrypted messages are unlikely to be relevant.
Alternatively, they could also directly access the content of encrypted commu-
nications that have been sent or received by an intercept ready device (or a virtual
“honeypot”) with a search warrant or general warrant. However, once again, this
requires statutory laws similar to the United States’ Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which do not presently exist within Canada.87
85 For example, social media website Facebook now supports Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL), an encrypted protocol that could enable its social networking communications
to be unreadable at the ISP level if it is set to default. Major web locker services, such
as Dropbox, already use SSL by default in addition to a number of additional measures
such as 2-step verification. Peter Swire explains that the growing adoption of strong
encryption in cyberspace “limits the usefulness of lawful access order[s].” [Ibid. at 5].
Although law enforcement agencies may still intercept encrypted Internet communica-
tions, it is virtually impossible to “crack” them if the encryption is used properly. Po-
lice can generally access the content of emails only if they are saved or stored on the
webmail’s servers (where they are not strongly encrypted). Thus, as noted earlier, Ca-
nadian LEAs may not be inclined or authorized to intercept and access the content in
real-time. Production orders represent the only lawful option to solely acquire en-
crypted messages online (but only after being received and stored). Again, the legal
controls around privacy protection set out in Part VI of the Criminal Code would not
apply to these circumstances.
86 As the Signals Intelligence Branch of the Ministry of National Defence, CSEC’s man-
date is to secure electronic information systems and to provide operational assistance to
federal LEA. However, it is prohibited by law from directing its “collection” activities
at any Canadian citizen (regardless of their location at the time of intercept) or at any
person within Canada. See Office of the Communications Security Establishment
Commissioner, Annual Report to Parliament (Ottawa: CSE Commissioner, 2012) at
10, online: <http://www.ocsec-bccst.gc.ca/ann-rpt/2011-2012/ann-rpt_e.pdf>.
87 CALEA is an act passed in 1994 that requires American Internet service providers to
have their network technologies “structured in such a way that law enforcement can
easily eavesdrop on electronic communications.” See Emily Hancock, “CALEA: Does
one size still fit all?” in JM Balkin, Cybercrime: digital cops in a networked environ-
ment (New York: New York University Press, 2007) at 184; Heidi McKee, “Policy
matters now and in the future: Net neutrality, corporate data mining, and government
surveillance” (2011) 28 Computers and Composition 276 at 286; William P Bloss,
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Therefore, if LEAs wish to intercept an encrypted message, they must remotely
access the computer after the encrypted message has been stored. However, this
would fall under the normal search and seizure provisions of the Criminal Code
and must be weighed against section 8 of the Charter as it is akin to executing a
search warrant on a domicile.
Perhaps the most striking fact in this argument is the inability of LEAs to
justify why they require legislative powers to circumvent encryption. The RCMP
does not provide statistics regarding how often encryption obstructs an investiga-
tion. However, in the U.S between 2000 and 2011, encryption was encountered
fewer than 10 times per year on average.88 Not once in 11 years did the presence of
the encryption prevent a LEA from monitoring a communication. Although this
does not necessarily correlate with the Canadian experience, it does suggest that the
declining trend in reported electronic surveillance is only negligibly affected by an
increase in the use of end-user encryption.
III. CONCLUSION
When it comes to privacy and accountability, people always demand the
former for themselves and the latter from everyone else.89
In law, as well as technology, Canada often follows the lead of its only land
neighbour. In the 1970s, the public revelations of Watergate and the Church Com-
mission in the US brought wiretapping out of the realm of detective fiction and put
it on the front page.90 In this article, however, we have observed and attempted to
explain why the use of one very particular form of surveillance — the electronic
interception of private communications — appears to be increasingly unpopular
with Canadian LEAs while the complete opposite trend appears in many other ju-
risdictions; particularly in the United States and the United Kingdom.91
“Transforming US police surveillance in a new privacy paradigm” (2009) 10:3 Police
Practice and Research 225 at 233.
88 US Courts, supra note 82.
89 David Brin, “The Transparent Society” Wired Magazine (December 1996) online:
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.12/fftransparent.html>.
90 The prevailing thought at the time was that a revolution in communications technology
could only amplify the trend of LEA’s use of wiretapping. After all, if electronic sur-
veillance devices were essentially undetectable, nothing prevented them from being
installed anywhere, targeting anyone. Indeed, a surveillance society at the expense of
citizens’ privacy seemed virtually inevitable. In 1969, Federal Minister of Justice John
Turner expressed his concerns to the Canadian Bar Association, cautioning “The inves-
tigator’s dream — making his subject a walking transmitter, and enabling the investi-
gator to hear everything the subject says to anybody else, or even what he mutters to
himself — can be realized by the wiring of a person’s clothing. We are told that there
are transmitters so small that they can be mounted as a tooth in a dental bridge . . . The
Orwellian society of 1984 may be here already.” John Turner, Minutes and Proceed-
ings of the 51st Annual Meeting of the Canadian Bar Association (Ottawa, 1969).
91 See Interception of Communications Commissioner, 2011 Annual Report of the Inter-
ception of Communications Commissioner (London, UK: Interception of Communica-
tions Commissioner, 2012) online: <http://www.intelligencecommissioners.com/
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We hope this will open up the field for future research on the concrete prac-
tices of surveillance in Canada. Who is under surveillance, where, why, and for
how long these individuals fall under the scrutiny of the state are all questions that
can be asked and should, to some degree, be answered by the Government of Can-
ada. While the government must certainly deploy intrusive and covert means to
carry out investigations in the public interest, this does not relieve investigators of
the onus to enumerate, explain and justify the ends of that surveillance to the public
afterward.
In this article, we have examined four decades of public reporting concerning
how Canadian federal authorities use electronic surveillance. What lessons
emerged? Why does it matter now? What further research would be useful? We
feel that the data presented in this study reveal four important trends which, while
not conclusive, offer a great deal of context to the state of surveillance in Canada:
• Turning off the tap: Court authorized surveillance of private communica-
tions has fallen dramatically in the period surveyed — for the numerous
legislative, judicial and administrative factors cited and there are likely
many others we have yet to unearth. However, as we have stressed in the
discussion of the figures, this does not mean that government monitoring
and tracking has ceased. Indeed, one of the more intriguing discoveries
emerging from the historical data is that dozens of individuals can be
targeted for surveillance under a single authorization. This explains why
statistics tracking numbers for total court-issued warrants indicate a drop,
even though individual notifications have remained relatively stable.
• Rubber stamping: LEAs argue that the authorization process can impede
investigations. Yet courts refused only a handful of warrant applications
since 1974. Clearly, police administrators and legal counsel have a very
rigorous internal system of checks to catch problem applications before
they are reviewed by a court official. However, any argument which por-
trays authorizations as obstructionist is more likely the result of LEAs’
own internal bureaucratic complexity rather than judicial obstinacy.
• Break in case of emergency: The statistics show that emergency authori-
zations have been used only 38 times since 1974 and only 10 times since
11 September 2001. Emergency authorizations have recently been judged
deficient because of the Supreme Court’s unanimous ruling on R. v. Tse
(2012) which found that section 184.4, which allowed interception with-
out a prior authorization, lacked proper safeguards and was therefore
unconstitutional.92 R. v. Tse suggests that, at minimum, emergency inter-
ception should require public reporting. Although Parliament has intro-
duced Bill C-55 in February 2013 to address this deficiency, this form of
docs/0496.pdf>. United States Courts, Wiretap Report 2011 (Washington DC, USA:
Administrative Office of the US Courts on behalf of the Federal Judiciary, 2012) online
<http://www.uscourts.gov/ Statistics/WiretapReports.aspx>.
92 R. v. Tse, supra note 75.
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public accountability should be extended to all forms of electronic
surveillance.93
• The unknown unknowns: Without a doubt, the most interesting questions
emerging from the reports we reviewed relate to what is not reported.
There are myriad forms of surveillance available for use by LEAs and we
posit that online investigations and electronic evidence gathering now le-
verages a whole set of techniques and tools quite apart from wiretapping
and bugging. These legal powers such as production orders, assistance
orders, general warrants, tracking devices and number recorders are all
easier powers of search and surveillance to execute (both in terms of le-
gal hurdles and resource requirements). Moreover, authorities are not cur-
rently required to notify the general public or Parliament when these
powers are used.94 Electronic surveillance can now take the form of mon-
itoring credit card records, on-board navigation records, website account
procurement (i.e. Facebook), or even data parsed together from disparate
sources using data mining software. Reporting requirements introduced
in the early 1970s simply have not kept up with the range of modalities
that LEAs use when conducting investigations.
We believe that the original intent of the 1974 Protection of Privacy Act was
to ensure invasive surveillance powers are used appropriately. However, over the
years LEAs have become hyper-cognizant that public opinion has the potential to
ruin both investigations and reputations. Back in Ottawa, numerous structural
changes to the law enforcement portfolio and myriad pressures that are natural in a
bureaucracy resulted in inconsistent reporting methodology in the annual reports to
Parliament. As we found, following the reports year over year demonstrates that the
numbers are constantly in flux and the methodology often changes radically with-
out explanation in the interim between one year and the next. Further, while com-
munications infrastructure has radically changed, the reporting mechanisms have
not changed at all. As a result, LEAs have been free to operate in the digital modes
without oversight all the while being able to produce reports which demonstrate the
contrary. Taken together, our findings are important because they demonstrate a
failure on the part of Parliament to demand modernized reporting requirements for
the networked age.
Restricting the use of wiretapping to serious crimes and requiring detailed An-
nual Reports were meant to be key components in democratically controlling au-
thorities’ surveillance practices. After all, the stakes associated with such surveil-
lance are very high: freedoms of assembly, speech and dissent, rights of
93 This article went for publication prior to the April 2013 deadline the SCC had imposed
for passage of Bill C-55.
94 As just one example, we lack any data on tracking devices for individuals or vehicles.
Yet, other authorities argue that geo-location has become one of the most important
data elements used when compiling an investigation. See Senator Ron Wyden, “Clear
Geolocation Guidelines are Needed to Protect Privacy Rights” US News and World
Report: Debate Club (25 June 2012) online: <http://www.usnews.com/debate-
club/should-probable-cause-be-required-for-police-to-use-cell-phone-location-data/
clear-geolocation-guidelines-are-needed-to-protect-privacy-rights>.
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association, movement and lawful protest all hinge on how the vast resources of
government to register, track, survey and monitor its citizens are restricted. Inter-
pretation of “reasonableness” requires public dialogue to match societal attitudes.
Without transparent reporting, interpretation of Section 8 rights becomes the exclu-
sive domain of the investigating body and a judge while the public is completely
left out of the conversation.
Particularly in the past ten years, Canada has wrestled with the issue of inva-
sive surveillance in a variety of contexts: airport security measures, the long-form
census, the firearms registry, Canada-US “Beyond the Border” perimeter security
plans, and other initiatives which all require citizens to lessen their expectation of
privacy to some extent. How and when government chooses to intrude upon the
lives of citizens can shape the trust and confidence citizens have in its authority and
legitimacy. Following fiascos such as the Maher Arar extradition, a Canadian citi-
zen who was arrested by American authorities acting on inaccurate Canadian intel-
ligence and tortured in Syria for eight months, Canadian law enforcement, espe-
cially the RCMP, are acutely aware of the repercussions of expanding beyond the
parameters set by Parliament and the courts.
For these reasons, Canada needs a detailed and thorough discussion of all
types of surveillance practices. However, before this can happen, we need to ex-
plore the best research and legal alternatives on how to moderate the invasive pow-
ers of the state, oversee the various agencies involved, and enforce accountability
from these bodies without needlessly encroaching on their ability to carry out their
protective mandates; a task for the more than capable pens of Canadian civil soci-
ety. However, as indicated in Section 8 of the Charter, the onus is upon the watch-
ers — not the watched — to explain and justify the powers they have before Parlia-
ment grants further invasive surveillance powers in such bills as the Investigating
and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act (bill C-30). As noted
above, at present, this explanation has not been forthcoming primarily because Par-
liament has failed to demand a clear accounting based on fact rather than anecdote
and ideology.
IV. FURTHER RESEARCH
Mapping out areas for future exploration is not difficult because there are glar-
ing gaps in every single section of our article which must be filled by future re-
search. We have a provisional picture of the landscape at best — filled with edges,
valleys and channels devoid of detail. As mentioned throughout, the growing role
that CSIS, CSEC and provincial police might play in the overall structure of sur-
veillance in Canada is largely invisible to us — a considerable dark spot in the
midst of our map. The Service, CSEC, their review bodies and provincial Attor-
neys-General all have a role in bringing transparency to the structure. Only these
organizations have the statistics, reporting data, and warrant application review
processes to fill in the blanks. It is entirely possible that the creation of CSIS
(1984), CSEC (created in 1946, but granted a legislative mandate by the Anti-Ter-
rorism Act in 2001) and a growing sophistication within provincial and municipal
policing has decentralized the use of electronic surveillance. The extent of this shift
would require considerable further research.
The costs and effectiveness of surveillance currently reported also requires se-
rious investigation, particularly because Public Safety Canada’s Annual Report gets
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thinner with each passing year. Compared with reports from the Office of the Solic-
itor-General in the mid-1990s, current reports are anaemically devoid of explana-
tion. Clearly, this is a seriously under-resourced priority in that Ministry and cer-
tainly not what Parliamentarians had in mind when reporting requirements were
established in law. Independent researchers with the requisite background in statis-
tics, criminology and legal training could make much of the historical data compar-
ing persons identified through surveillance versus those arrested, charged, brought
to trial or successfully prosecuted.
Finally, as others have argued convincingly, we need analysis, or at least edu-
cated estimates, of a reasonable sort on all other forms of surveillance mentioned in
this article such as production orders — call that the “ocean” that surrounds the
map we have set out. The UK and US require detailed public reporting and inde-
pendent review of many of these forms of surveillance. Without similar evidence
and consideration, the Canadian public remains dangerously in the dark. Critical
questions about privacy, due process, lawful authority and reasonable surveillance
deserve clarity and transparency so that they may be included in the public dis-
course by legislators, courts and Canadian citizens. 
